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Abstrak
Makalah ini berargumentasi, berlawanan dengan pendapat yang umum diterima, Republik Rakyat Cina (RRC) turut
serta dalam Konfrontasi Indonesia untuk mengganyang Malaysia dengan setengah hati. Malahan, berlawanan dengan
propagandanya yang sangat menggebu, RRC pada dasarnya merupakan pihak yang berpartisipasi dalam konfrontasi
dengan secara pasif. Gejala ini disebabkan oleh fakta bahwa pada waktu konfrontasi berlangsung Partai Komunis
Malaya yang didukung Cina tengah menerapkan kebijakan yang lebih lunak terhadap pemerintah Malaysia. Tambahan
lagi, RRC mungkin sekali lebih peduli terhadap nasib golongan etnik Cina di Malaysia daripada mendukung partai
komunis lokal.

Abstract
This paper argues that contrary to the traditionally accepted opinion, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) participated
in the Indonesian campaign to crush Malaysia half-heartedly. In fact, despite its strong propaganda broadcast in
supporting Indonesia, the PRC was actually a passive participant in the campaign. This is due to the fact that at that time
the Chinese supported Malayan Communist Party, which was pursuing a more conciliatory policy toward the Malaysian
government. Furthermore, China was probably more concerned with the well-being of ethnic Chinese Malaysia than
supporting the local communist party.
Keywords: Sino-Indonesian relations, Sino-Malaysian relations, Indonesia politics and diplomacy, Chinese politics
and diplomacy, Malaysian politics and diplomacy.

In the meantime, however, there were two separate
developments, which pushed further the formation of
Malaysia. Within the UMNO leadership emerged a
belief, which came up initially in 1956 and became
more established by 1960, that the indigenous people
of Borneo should be considered Malays. Therefore, the
inclusion of former British colonies into a federation,
even if Singapore were included, would not jeopardize
the ethnic balance of the new state. In the meantime,
political development in Singapore in the early 1960s
contributed to the hastiness of the Malaysian
formation. The government of the People’s Action
Party (PAP) under Lee Kuan Yew, although it tended
to be left-learning, was losing the elections to the more
radical faction of the party which later established its
own organization, the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist
Front), which was communist-oriented. In fact, since
1948 when elections were introduced, the political
radicalism, while the British planned to give the colony

1. Introduction
Although the idea of uniting all former British colonies
in the Malay Peninsula, North Borneo and Singapore
was not new1, it was Tunku A. Rahman who first
publicly announced the proposal for the establishment
of the federation of Malaysia on May 27, 1961. In
addition to the proposal, there was also a concept for a
smaller merger between Malaya and Singapore. This
idea, however, was not too popular among UMNO
leaders. The inclusion of the tiny island, whose
population is mostly Chinese, would certainly threaten
the ethnic balance in Malaya, which was favorable to
the Malays.
1

Most Information in this section, unless specified,
originated from Milne and Mauzy, Politics and Government
in Malaysia, (Singapore: Times Books International, 1980),
Chapter 4.

58

MAKARA, SOSIAL HUMANIORA, VOL. 6, NO.2, DESEMBER 2002

independence in 1963. The Malay leaders, being antiCommunists, were very concerned about a possible
independent and communist-dominated Singapore,
which would be used as a base to help their Malayan
comrades (Andaya, 1982: 270–71). The possibility of
Singapore becoming the “Southeast Asian Cuba” was
in the minds of the anti-Communist Tunku and the
British government.
The formation of Malaysia, which included all British
colonies in Southeast Asia with the exception of
Brunei, therefore, was an escape clause from the threat
of ethnic imbalance and communism. In addition, the
Tunku Abdulrahman expected economic benefit from
Singapore inclusion. China’s accusation that the new
state was a Western-created bastion against
communism in the area was, therefore, not baseless.

2. Methodology
This study relies mostly on information and official
statements found in the Chinese media. During the
period covered by this study the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) was still a closed society in which
everything, including all forms of mass media
(newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts) were
placed under the very tight control of the government.
Some scholars, like Domes (1983: 69–83) remind us
about possible “misinformation” in China’s statements.
We, therefore should be careful in using those official
statements. Fingar (1980) on the contrary, suggests that
this consciousness should be specifically applied to
such domestic policies as agriculture, economy,
education and culture, and other similar matters.
Unlike domestic policies, which might be distorted in
the process of their creation and implementation,
foreign policy is carried out under the close
management of professional bureaucrats. Liao and
Whiting’s study Fingar (1980) on Renmin Ribao
(People’s Daily) during the Sino-Indian border crisis of
1962 proves the reliability of the newspaper as a
measurement of Chinese authoritative reactions to
particular events. Dillon (1977:457) describe Peking
Review as “an accurate and reliable indicator of official
Chinese foreign policy perceptions.” Furthermore
Tretiak’s (1971) close reading on news reports and
analysis of Peking Review during the closing years of
the Cultural Revolution indicates its reliability in
predicting changes in certain areas of foreign policy.
We may assume, therefore, that foreign policy
statements, which are found in the Chinese media, are
in accordance with the intended policy.
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3. Analysis and Data Interpretations
3.1. Indonesian Confrontation and China’s Support
The information of Malaysia was opposed by two of its
neighbors: Indonesia and the Philippines. The external
and internal politics of Indonesia under Sukarno after
1959 were leaning toward leftist radicalism. The
Philippines opposition was based on a claim that North
Borneo had historical been an area governed by the
Sultan of Sulu, a region which now belongs to the
Philippines.
When the Malaysia concept was announced in mid1961 Indonesia was still busy with diplomatic and
armed efforts to liberate West Irian (West New Guinea
or now Irian Jaya) from Dutch hands. Thus, Sukarno
and other Indonesia leaders seemed not to harbor any
abjection to the Malaysian formation. Marvin Ott notes
that the initial negative reaction came from the PKI. He
based his finding on a resolution adopted by the party
in its Third Plenum of the Central Committee which
condemned the Malaysian Plan as a “colonial intrigue”
unacceptable to the local people, created by British
colonialist to maintain their interest in the area. But
after the West Irian conflict was resolved in favor of
Indonesia in September 1961, even non-communist
parties and leaders of Indonesia started to voice
opposition to the plan (Ott, 1971). By the end of 1963,
the war of words escalated into an armed conflict
involving Great Britain, which, obliged by its defense
agreement with Malaysia, sent its soldiers to fight the
Indonesian military intrusion.
Indonesia’s confrontation came into the open when a
military rebellion occurred in Brunei on December 8,
1962, a British-protected sultanate in North Borneo.
The leader of the uprising, A.M. Azahari, was a proIndonesia nationalist who believed that the inclusion of
the tiny kingdom into Malaysia would hinder his
nationalist goals and his personal ambition. The
rebellion was easily suppressed by the British Army.
Ott observes that although the rebellion was brief, it
nonetheless, among other consequences, became the
justification for Indonesian opposition to the
Federation of Malaysia (Ott, 1971). Indeed,
Indonesia’s argument for confrontation was based on a
belief that the Federation of Malaysia was formed
without local consent, especially in North Borneo.
Indonesian leaders throughout the confrontation period
always repeated this theme.
There are so many interpretations to the background of
Indonesia’s “crush Malaysia” campaign. Malaysian
leaders usually referred to it as an expression of
jealousy on the Indonesian part because of Malaysia’s
successes in economic development. They also viewed
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it as a manifestation of Indonesian and Chinese
communist success in embracing Sukarno (Khaw,
1972: 219–20). Again; the Tunku and his supporters
saw Chinese hands behind Sukarno and Indonesia’s
back. Gordon (1963) regarded the confrontation as an
exhibition of Indonesia’s expansionist ideology.
In reality there was no simple explanation behind the
Indonesian action. Hindley (1964: 904–13) enumerates
several factors. Indonesian leadership under Sukarno
had several grievances against Malaysia. They strongly
believed that the Moslem rebels who threatened
Indonesia’s existence in 1948-1962 were financed and
aided by the West from Malaya. Malayan territories
were also used to give support and asylum to leaders of
provincial military rebellion in the late 1950s. They
furthermore believed that the existence of Malaysia,
still controlled by the British, would remain a base for
subversive against Indonesia. Added to this was the
failure of Malaysian leaders and the British to consult
Jakarta when they planned the formation of the
federation. Sukarno’s dream to make his country have
a dominant status in the region was also a contributing
factor. Ott (1971) added the antagonistic personalities
between Sukarno and Tunku, and Malaysian
displeasure over Sukarno’s pro-Beijing polities.
Current argument is offered by Subritzky (2000: 1–31).
He argues that Sukarno who was strongly committed to
eliminate remnants of Western colonialism in Asia.
Originally it was the Dutch who was the target of his
campaign, but when the conflict over Irian Jaya was
settled in favor of the Indonesian claim, Sukarno
turned his focus on the British, and by the beginning of
1963 he directed his attention to the British plan in
Malaysia. And direct opposition to it. Her alleged that
the Malaysian plan was a stepping-stone for Western
imperialism to continue controlling Southeast Asia.
Indonesia’s experience of facing Malaya, which
supported the PRRI/Permesta dissidents who were
longing for separate states, exacerbated Sukarno’s
suspicion. In addition Sukarno had hard feeling toward
Malaysia who was abstain in UN voting regarding
West Irian status. From Malaysian side, Sukarno was
regarded as a dangerous leader who had a great
sympathy to both Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
as well as to China, and therefore had to be opposed.
Whatever the case, the Indonesian campaign to “crush
Malaysia” (Ganyang Malaysia) was notably marked by
a growing closer relationship between Jakarta and
Beijing.
In coming to the discussion of the Jakarta-Beijing axis
we must first overview the state of the relationship
among U.S., the Soviet Union and China after 1960. It
was apparent that approaching 1963 Sino-Soviet
differences over a whole range of such important issues
as ideology, the international communist movement,
war and peace, the relationship among socialist states

and with non-communist countries had reached an
irreconcilable phase. To make the conflict worse, in
1963 the Soviet Union and the U.S., together with
British signed the so-called Test Ban Treaty, an
agreement were so loose and ambiguous. The
signatories were not forbidden to conduct underground
nuclear arms tests, not did it tie them to hold the treaty,
therefore, tended to strengthen Soviet and American
domination over such weapons, to the expense of such
minor countries as China. Therefore, the PRC could
not accept the treaty and accused the Soviet Union of
colluding with America to practice nuclear hegemony.
This situation and the withdrawal of Soviet economic,
technical and military aid from China led Mao and his
supporters to be self-reliant in domestic and foreign
policies, and to the development of China’s own
nuclear weapons. This was the time when the
“revisionism” brand was applied to the Soviet Union
and radical foreign policy was followed. Now, the
“Soviet revisionist” and “U.S. imperialists” were
China’s main enemies.
As to how the Sino-Indonesian axis finally came into
being, Peter C. Hauswedell’s study (Hindley, 1964)
gives us some insight into background. According to
Hauswedell, by 1963, there were two regional conflicts
considered to be threats to peace and stability in
Southeast Asia: Vietnam and Malaysia. The political
situation in Vietnam was developing into a full-scale
military conflict involving one of the superpowers
more directly. Being close to the area of conflict, China
was very concerned about a possible Sino-American
confrontation, as had taken place in Korea in 1950.
Conscious of the superiority of the U.S., Chinese
leaders advised their Hanoi Comrades to act with great
cautiousness and to avoid any large-scale and frontal
attack on South Vietnam.
The opening of Indonesia’s confrontation, therefore,
was not greatly welcomed by China. In the first place,
in comparison to Vietnam, Malaysia was not as
important to China’s security. The mid-1960s was a
time when the “second intermediate zone” emerged in
Mao’s strategic thinking. In opposing Malaysia,
Indonesia was facing England, a country of
“intermediate zone” which had to be courted by
Beijing. In addition, China was more interested in
maintaining a good relationship with London – because
the British attitude toward China was different from the
U.S. and because of the China’s economic and trade
interests in British—controlled Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, China overall interest in the region was
mainly to remove any military threat from its
neighbors. Indonesia’s confrontation, contrary to
China’s objective, had invited a strong additional
British military presence. The combination of those
factors, according to Hauswedell, made the Chinese
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leadership hesitate in giving full support to Sukarno’s
confrontation.
China, however, was very eager to support the PKI in
its effort to gain power in Indonesian politics. Being
the largest communist party outside the socialist bloc,
the PKI was very important for China in its
competition with the Soviet Union to win sympathy
and support from other communist parties. As has been
indicated above, the PKI was the first to sound
opposition to the Malaysian plan. For the PKI and
Sukarno confrontation was important, although both
viewed this for different reasons. The PKI wanted the
Indonesian army, its arch-rival, to be busy with an
external threat so the party could buy the time to
strengthen itself for possible seizure of power. Sukarno
wished confrontation would shift the army’s attention
from crushing the PKI. For him, the fall of the party
would also mean his demise, as later happened in
September 1965. The Indonesian army itself, being an
anti-Chinese anti-Communist force, looked at the
establishment of Malaysia and Singapore’s fusion into
it as a formation of a Chinese-dominated country,
possibly being pro-China in the long run. Some army
leaders, viewed, the Malaysian project, protected under
the western military shadow, as a hindrance to
Indonesia’s ambition to become the dominant power of
the region. The army, therefore, supported the
confrontation with the understanding that it would be
carried out with limited military involvement (Crouch,
1978: 55–62). Thus, Indonesia’s domestic political
maneuvering
caused
everybody,
to
borrow
Hauswedell’s words to jump onto the “bandwagon” of
the confrontation.
Meanwhile, the Hanoi leadership, disregarding
Beijing’s advice to act cautiously, adhered to a more
radical stand against American escalation and launched
an all-out war. Therefore, Hanoi’s radicalism, the
PKI’s support of Sukarno’s confrontation and the
Beijing-Moscow conflict moved the PRC into a more
active policy in supporting Indonesia, although it was
not involved militarily.
Sukarno’s confrontation turned from vocal to military
when a U.N. special agency, formed for the purpose of
investigating whether the federation plan was
supported by local people, found that the Indonesian
objection was unfounded. Sukarno’s proclamation of
confrontation in September 1963 was not illogical. The
Tunku announced the establishment of the Federation
of Malaysia before the U.N. Commission issued its
findings openly.
China first propaganda support of Indonesia’s
confrontation emerged in April 1963. An article, which
appeared in Shijie Zhishi, commented on the
publication of a white paper regarding the
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establishment of Malaysia on February 2, 1963. The
federation, according to the article, was formed for the
purpose of protecting British interests in Singapore,
Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. It was also meant
to suppress the people’s struggle for independence in
the area, that is to say, “using the federation [from the
state] to unify and rule” and “to divide and rule.”
Moreover, the “British imperialist” was using “the
independent federation” to strengthen its military
presence in Southeast Asia for the purpose of further
aggression. In addition, the British used the new state
to maintain their economic interests in the area since
British capitalist monopolized 70 percent of rubber
production and 60 percent of copper and 60-70 percent
of the area’s foreign trade (Bi Wen, 1963: 16).
Referring to the Malaysia plan’s relationship to “U.S.
imperialism” the article continued:
American imperialism has great military and
economic interest in the area. [Therefore] on the one
hand it welcomes and supports the “Malaysian
Federation,” but on the other hand it shamelessly cuts
the ground from the British feet. The U.S. President
Kennedy several times voiced American support for
the plan “because it is a hope to protect the security
of the region.” In reality, U.S. activities are squeezing
the British … [because] since late 1961 [the U.S.] by
using the Philippines President Macapagal proposed
an “enlarged Federation of Malaysia” consisting of
Singapore, Malaya, North Borneo, and the
Philippines.

Dagongbao (17 September 1963) called the Malaysian
plan a “joint production” of “U.S. imperialist and
British colonialist,” and jokingly it said, therefore, be
called Mei lai Dongya—which means “America comes
to [south] East Asia—instead of Malaysia.”
After Sukarno’s formal announcement of his “crush
Malaysia” campaign in late 1963, China’s support was
even more vocal. Now the Chinese media started to
link American support under Presidents John Kennedy
and Lyndon Johnson to establishment of the federation
of Malaysia by the “British colonialist” was an
exchange for the British support the just struggle of the
Indonesian people to fight “old and new colonialism”
(Dagongbao, 27 March 1964). “New colonialism” was
Sukarno’s favorite term in his reference to Malaysia.
The People’s Daily called the Federation of Malaysia a
“neo-colonialist product of British imperialism” with
Washington’s blessing. Its purpose was to suppress
national liberation and peace movement in Southeast
Asia. At the same time, it constituted a threat to peace
movements in Southeast Asia. At the same time, it
constituted a threat to peace and security of the area,
particularly to Indonesia.2

2

Dagongbao, 27 March 1964, see also Chao Hai, Malaixiya,
Xin Zhiminzhuyi de Chanwu” [ Malaysia, A product of NeoColonialism], Shijie Zhishi, (19 October 1964), pp.26-27
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China’s opposition to Malaysia reached a new degree,
when in November 1964 the Malaysian government
announced the opening of the Nationalist Chinese
government Consulate General in Kuala Lumpur.
Although the announcement also emphasized that the
decision “does not imply a change in Malaysian policy
of recognizing neither the Kuomintang China nor the
Communist China.” Beijing reacted strongly and
accused Kuala Lumpur of approaching a policy of
recognition of Taiwan, an act of hostility toward China.
In addition, quoting the Nationalist China news
agency, Beijing mentioned the existence of military
cooperation between the “Jiang Gang” and the Tunku
government in forming an anti-Communist front in
Asia and in suppressing communist guerrilla activities
in Malaya (NCNA, 1 December 1964 & SCMP 3350, 4
December 1964: 37-38). China also blamed American
encouragement to both Taipei and Kuala Lumpur for
Taiwan’s involvement in the Malaysia dispute3. It was,
according to China, Malaysian support American
policy to create “one China and one Taiwan” and a
“dirty political plot” against the PRC (Renmin Ribao, 2
December 1964).
Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia accelerated
to a higher degree when in December 1964; Malaysia
was elected a non-permanent member of the U.N.
membership on January 7, 1965. It regarded the
decision to seat Malaysia as the outcome of a situation
created by colonial powers in the U.N who were
against Indonesia’s principle of oposing colonialism
(Boyce, 1968: 104–105). It was not suprising that
China, being kept out of the international organization
for so long, welcomed Indonesia’s decision. People’s
Daily regarded the Malaysian sitting in the Security
Council as “naked provocation and hostility toward
Indonesia.” The paper suggested that the exit of
Indonesia was another ample fact that the U.N.,
dominated by “U.S. imperialism,” acted as a “tool for
aggression.”4In reference to Sukarno’s speech after his
withdrawal, the paper said: Sukarno correctly said that
the crown of real freedom does not lie in being a
member of the United Nations. A country, which
cannot stand its own feet, is not a free and independent
country even if it is a member of the United Nations.
“Malaysia” is an accurate example [of the principle]
(Renmin Ribao, 11 January 1965). Thus, Malaysia was
singled out as an example of a country without full
independent. Another article in Shijie Zhishi described
3

“Jielu Meiguo Cedong Jiang Bangshen Shenru Malaixiya
de Yinmou” [Unveil the American-instigated Plot to Include
Jiang Cligue Into The Malaysian Plot], Renmin Ribao,
editorial, 2 December 1964.
4

“Jianjue Zhizhi Yindunixiya Tuichu Lianheguo”
[Resolutely Support Indonesia’s Withdrawal from the United
Nations]. Renmin Ribao, editorial, 11 January 1965.

Malaysia as a “U.S. imperialism tool” in its scheme to
“use Asians to fight Asians” (Ge Geng, 1965: 15–16).
The close ties between Indonesia and China during
1963-1965 were forged at a time when both countries
were internationally isolated. Most neutral countries
resented Indonesia’s growing radicalism on the
questions of Malaysia. China, in the meantime, was
also isolated by the western powers and among the
neutralists, while its dispute with the Soviet Union
estranged it as well from the eastern bloc, with the
exception of Albania. Mozingo (1976) described the
Sino-Indonesian relationship as an attempt to establish
a “third force strategy.” The purpose was to oppose
both the U.S and the Soviet Union. Internationally, the
period was specifically marked by Sukarno’s efforts,
since his withdrawal from the U.N., to form the “New
Emerging Forces” (NEFO) to oppose the “Old
Established Forces (OLDEFO). For that purpose
Sukarno wanted to form the conference of the New
Emerging Forces (CONEFO) as an alternative to the
U.N. As for the China’s part, it tried to form an
international united front against a status quo, which
was coerced by America and the Soviet Union. The
support given by China to Indonesia’s confrontation
against Malaysia was a manifestation of the close SinoIndonesia cooperation. However, the sudden
turnaround following the September 30 affair in 1965,
with the crushing of the PKI and leftist elements in
Indonesia including Sukarno, the confrontation came to
a sudden stop, while the Sino-Indonesian axis
disintegrated. Indonesia officially terminated the
confrontation in 1966. The PRC, however, continued to
oppose Malaysia due to political developments in
China during the Cultural Revolution.
3.2. China’s Continuation of Confrontation
The sudden political change in Indonesia after the
September 30, 1965 Affair, followed by Sukarno’s fall
and the purges of the PKI and other leftist elements,
caused the sudden stop of Indonesia confrontation
against Malaysia. Although initially reluctant to join in
the Malaysian conflict, the PRC was now left alone to
continue the confrontation. Regarding Indonesia’s
discontinuation of the struggle against Malaysia,
Beijing accused the Jakarta’s decision to be a result of
“U.S. and British imperialist” persuasion and pressure
on the Indonesia “right wing military regime” (NCNA,
2 June 1966) As in the past, in reference to the
Federation of Malaysia, China continued to use such
derogatory terms as “the so-called Malaysia,” or to put
the world “Malaysia” within quotation marks and in
other ways insinuate the new state’s non-existence.
On the diplomatic front, to fill the gap left by
Indonesia, China welcomed the establishment of the
“Permanent Mission of the Malayan National
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Liberation League” (MNLL) in Beijing on January 12,
1966. According to P.V. Sharma, possibly a
Singaporean or Malaysian India, who acted as the
chairman of the mission, the MNLL was united front
organization representing various Malayan and
Singaporean “People’s movement at home and abroad”
in struggle to “crush Malaysia” in order to achieve
“true independence, democracy and peace in Malaya.”
Following China’s rhetoric, Sharma also indicated that
the Malayan people had learned from their experience
that to free themselves from the rule of imperialism
and its “puppets,” the act of “revolutionary violence”
was the only answer to “counter-revolutionary war”
(Renmin Ribao, 13 January 1966). Kang Yonghe, the
Vice Chairman of the Chinese Commission for AfroAsian Solidarity, who gave a welcoming reception to
the Malaysian organization, pledged that the Chinese
people would continue to support the Malayan people’s
persistent struggle against “U.S. and British
imperialists” and their “lackeys.” Referring to the
Malayan people’s fight to “crush Malaysia,” Kang
called it a part of the struggle of the peoples all over
the world to oppose imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism.5 On February 1, 1966, in another Beijing
reception, Sharma announced that the Malayan
people’s struggle was entering its eighteenth year,
while he also mentioned that various organizations
under the MNLL condemned the “Soviet revisionists”
who cooperate with the U.S. and its “running dogs” in
splitting the anti-imperialists forces. Therefore, the
Malayan people would always strongly fight against
“modern revisionism (Renmin Ribao, 2 February
1966).” Sharma’s and Kang’s statements revealed that
in alluding to the local government officials in
Malaysia (and Singapore) both Malayan and Chinese
communists, up to the mid-1960s, still refrained from
mentioning those Malaysian official’s by name. In May
1966, when the PRC successfully tested its first nuclear
explosion, Sharma sent a congratulatory note on the
occasion. He said the China’s new weapon gave
“added impetus” to the Malayan people in their
struggle to “crush Malaysia” as the British and U.S.
“neo-colonial product.” At the same time, the
explosion had “internationally broken the American
and Soviet monopoly over nuclear arms” (NCNA, 19
May 1966 & SCMP 3705, 25 may 1966: 26-27).
Entering 1967 China was in the midst of the Cultural
Revolution. Showing his pro-China stand, in a
reception to commemorate the “18th anniversary of the
struggle of the Malayan people,” Sharma said:
“From our revolution practice the Malayan people
fully realized that Mao’s thought is the compass
guiding us toward victory. We, Malayan people, hail
the history successes of the Red Guards, workers,
peasant, soldiers, revolutionary students and

intellectuals have already achieved and will continue
to achieve in the course of the Cultural Revolution”
(NCNA, 1 February 1967, & SCMP 1806, 7
February1967: 32).

Again, indicating his pro-China posture in the SinoSoviet conflict, he also accused the “Soviet revisionist”
who has openly supported Malaysia. Even when
Singapore released itself from the federation and
gained its own “independence,” the “Soviet
revisionist” lost no time in embracing the “Lee Kuan
Yew puppet” and its “new type of colony” (NCNA, 19
May 1966 & SCMP 3705, 25 May 1967: 32–33).
The year 1967 was a time when indications emerged in
Malaysian foreign policy that it was moving form right
to center. This began when Malaysia together with
other countries formed the Association of Southeast
Asia Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. One year later
Malaysia forwarded a proposal to make Southeast Asia
a neutral zone (to be discussed in Chapter IX). The
declaration of the ASEAN formation followed the
ratification of the Bangkok Declaration on August 8,
1967 by representative from Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The next day
Xinhua reacted very strongly by accusing the
association of being a “new anti-China, anti communist
alliance,” formed under the order of “U.S.
imperialism.” The Chinese news agency also said that
the economic, social, administrative, technical, and
scientific cooperation, which was mentioned by the
Bangkok Declaration, was only a cover to its actual
objectives, namely, to act as a part of the U.S.
imperialism ring to encircle China. Thus, ASEAN was
none other than the “twin brothers” of SEATO (NCNA,
9 August 1967 & SCMP 4000, 14 August 1967). People
Daily added another accusation that ASEAN was a
joint-defense organization to meet “China’s threat.”
Therefore, since SEATO existed only in name,
ASEAN was another variant of SEATO6.
Toward the end of 1967 China’s propaganda against
Malaysia was included in its quarrel with the Russians.
In October the Tunku announced the Malaysian
intention to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union. People Daily, while reminding readers that
Malaysia was a “product manufactured by the U.S. and
British colonialism-imperialism” to sabotage the
national liberation movement in Southeast Asia, also
said that: The Soviet revisionist clique’s opening
relations with “Malaysia” is not difficult to understand,
[because] for years they have been trying to make
friends with U.S. imperialist lackeys and running does
in Asia. The purpose is to strengthen their counterrevolutionary collusion with U.S. imperialism in order
6

5

Renmin Ribao, 13 January 1966, see also Renmin Ribao, 23
June 1966 for the same statement by Kang Yonghe.
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“Meidi Zougou de Fangeming Xiao Lianmeng” [A Small
Counter-revolutionary Association of U.S. Imperialist
Running Dogs], Renmin Ribao (Editorial), 12 August 1967.
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The Rahman-Razak puppet clique’s military
expansion has had the support of the Soviet
revisionists. Social – imperialists, and the British
imperialism. Malayan papers disclosed that Soviet
revisionism actually helped the Rahman-Razak
puppet clique to reorganize the navy and expand the
air force and is preparing to provide artillery, tanks,
and airplanes and other modern weapon to equip the
reactionary troops of “Malaysia,” together with a
large sum of money as military aid to the puppet
clique. British imperialists with its accomplices,
Australian and Indian reactionary have in the past
few months been shipping small arms (NCNA, 23
February 1968 & SCMP 4126, 27 February 1968:
30).

to encircle China and also to realize their own type of
neo-colonial-ism. At the same time it was not a
coincidence that the Rahman reactionary group wants
to cooperate with Soviet revisionist clique [to oppose
China] (Renmin Ribao, 22 October 1967).
The opening of Malaysian-Soviet relations marked the
increasing resentment of China toward Malaysia. Now,
both the MNLL’s and PRC’s propaganda directly
called the Malaysian and Singaporean governments as
“Rahman-Lee puppets,” “cliques,” or “running dogs.”
Commenting on the visit of Foreign Minister Tun
Abdul Razak to the Soviet Union in mid-1968, the
People’s Daily, quoting MNLL’s organ the Malayan
Bulletin, called the visit a clear sign of the
strengthening of “counter-revolutionary cooperation”
between the “Soviet revisionists and the Malaysian
puppets” (Renmin Ribao, 28 June 1968). Xinhua, again
quoting the Malayan Bulletin, charged that Soviet
intrusion into Southeast Asia by forging a close
relationship with Malaysia was caused by its fear of
China’s high prestige and the influence of Mao’s
thought in the region, which was being followed by the
revolutionary Malayan and Southeast Asian Peoples
(NCNA, 27 June 1968). Another article publishing by
Xinhua in early 1968 clearly accused Malaysia of being
the puppet of England, the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
and therefore, should be eliminated.

It is interesting to note that most Chinese media’s
references to Malaysia were taken from other sources,
especially various bulletins published by the MNLL in
Beijing and by underground communist newsletter in
Malaysia and Singapore. Those sources tended to
exaggerate and even to falsify the facts. In reality there
is no evidence to support Beijing’s allegations that
Moscow, as early as 1969, had supplied or was ready
to supply Malaysia with arms and military equipment.
The anti-Communist Tunku’s influence in 1969 was
still great and unchallenged openly. In addition, most
of Malaysia’s military hardware originated from
Britain, America and other Western countries.
3.3. The Cultural Revolution and the MCP

Malaya [including Singapore] continues to be a British
new-type colony to this day, and due to the decline of
British imperialism, the danger of U.S. imperialism
replacing it in enslaving the Malayan people is
becoming graver. The Soviet revisionist is stepping up
their collusion with Rahman-Lee puppet groups in the
attempt to undermine the Malayan people’s
revolutionary struggle. Hence, to eliminate the
influence of British imperialism, which is aided by
Soviet modern revisionists, the Malayan people must
overthrow the Rahman-Lee puppet regimes (Renmin
Ribao, 20 January 1969).

Except for references to the activities and statements of
the MNLL in Beijing under Sharma which always
upheld armed struggle under the guidance of Mao’s
Thought as the guiding principle to fight against
imperialist “lackeys” and to “Crush the puppet state
Malaysia,” the Chinese media throughout 1966 and
1967 did not cover many MCP activities. Even in
reporting those activities, Chinese newspapers relied
mostly on new bulletins and statements issued by the
MNLL and underground newspapers published by antiMalaysian fighters in Singapore and Malaysia.8

Since early 1969, China’s propaganda attacked the
Soviet Union’s change of policy to Malaysia. Only two
years ago charged the People’s Daily in February
1969, the Soviet Union accused Malaysia as being an
“imperialist-created puppet state.” Now, on the
contrary, the “Soviet revisionist” had pledged to
cooperate with that “puppet state.”7 By the end of
1969, for Chinese propaganda, Malaysia had become
the project of collusion among Chinese enemies on all
fronts to suppress “people” and to oppose China.
Commenting on the expansion of Malaysian armed
forces, Xinhua argued:

Political developments in Singapore and Malaysia,
however, changed the fates of two leftist organizations
during confrontation. In Singapore, the pro-Beijing
Barisan Sosialis suffered a stunning defeat. The party
policy’s of parroting Chinese (and Indonesian) slogans
as “crush Malaysia” and “phoney independence”
alienated its constituents. General opinion considered
the party to be the “voice of Peking,” and therefore, its
popular support eroded. In Malaysia the left – leaning
Socialist Front suffered the same defeat, caused mainly
by a breakup within its leadership. The Malaysian
party was a fusion between Malay leftist socialist and

7

8

NCNA, 4 September 1969, in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), DR, CC, 1.172 (5 September
1969), pp A12-13.

See for example, Peking Review, 7 (11 February 1966), p.4;
Renmin Ribao, 13 January 1966, 2 February 1966, 23 June
1966, 12 December 1967.
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Chinese labor Organizations. In February 1966, both
factions decided to seek the their own ways (Pillai,
1966). Although the Malaysian party was against the
creation of Malaysia, and thus, in line with Indonesia’s
and China’s policy, communalism hindered its unity. It
was also apparent that Indonesia’s abandonment of
confrontation has left the future of the “crush
Malaysia” campaigns a big question mark. In the
meantime, in spite of Beijing’s cultural revolutionary
massive propaganda and reports on the opposition of
the people to the “Puppet State Malaysia,” the MCP,
which was mainly active in the Thai-Malaysian border,
was not quick to adopt radicalism as preached from
Beijing. Taylor assumes that there might have been an
internal conflict within the party on the issues of armed
struggle. Chin Peng might have been reluctant to
follow radical policy, while there were others within
the leadership who preferred to follow China’s
directives (Taylor, 1974: 312–12). Just a during the
1963-1965 period when Indonesia, backed by China,
was still actively following a confrontational policy,
China did not report the activities of the communist in
West Malaysia. Its reports on confrontation against
Malaysia still concentrated on armed struggle in North
Borneo.
The MCP’s first answer to the Chinese Cultural
Revolutionary call for world revolution came in midDecember 1967. People’s Daily, quoting the
underground Malaysian paper Malayan Herald
reported that the MCP, which followed MarxismLeninism (a key word for China’s path in the SinoSoviet conflict), always “raises high the red banner of
Mao’s Thought,” All member of the party, according to
the article, were diligently studying the teaching of
Mao, because all guerilla fighters of Malayan People’s
Liberation Army (MNLA) were always listening
carefully to the broadcasts on Mao’s Thought via
Radio Beijing (Renmin Ribao, 12 December 1967). In
addition, Malayan Bulletin, the organ of the MNLL in
Beijing in mid-February 1968 described the situation in
“guerilla zones” near the Thai-Malaysian border. The
report was full of praise of Mao’s Thought and Maoist
rhetoric.
Inspired by Mao’s Thought, The MNLA and people
in guerilla zones fight heroically and tenaciously ...
smashed the offensive of the U.S. backed British
imperialist and the Malaya puppet clique’s attack on
the Malay-Thai border regions and guerrilla zones in
North Malaya … In all those struggles the broad
masses of the people manifested a spirit of daring to
struggle and to win. Although in almost every
instance they met with broad masses of the people
who do not fear imprisonment, injury or sacrifice,
battle the armed troops and police of the enemy. The
mass struggles have proved that the Rahman–Lee
cliques are paper tigers (NCNA, 23 February 1968 &
SCMP 4126, 27 February 1968: 29-30).
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Reminiscences of Chinese communist experience
during the war against Japan and the Chinese
Nationalist was shown when the report mentioned that
the government of the guerrilla zones were all carrying
out land economic system as a means to be self –
governed and self – supported (NCNA, 23 February 1968
& SCMP 4126, 27 February 1968: 29-30). On June 1,
1968, which was the twentieth anniversary of
communist rebellion in Malaya, the MCP issued a
statement on the resurgence of its armed struggle was
based on a principle of “using revolutionary armed
strength against counter-revolutionary armed strength,”
and “surrounding the cities from the countryside”
(Guangmin Ribao, 19 June 1968)
China answers MCP’s call with a CCP congratulatory
note on the twentieth anniversary of communist
struggle in Malaya. The letter supported the MCP’s
decision to reactive armed struggle as propagated by
China.
The CCP believes that the MCP, which has gone
trough the fierceness of battle experience and has
been hardened by fighting encounters will combine
the universal truth Marxism, Leninism and Mao
Zedong’s Thought with concrete conditions in
Malaya. [The party will] firmly hold to the red banner
of the armed struggle, unite closely with all Malayan
races, develop and continue armed struggle and will
lead the Malayan people to rid British imperialism
and U.S. aggressors [in its efforts] to overthrow the
Rahman-Lee puppet cliques and to established a new
and independent Malaya [based on] unity and
democracy (Renmin Ribao, 30 June 1968).

The Malaysian government confirmed the resurgence
of communist-armed struggle by the publication of a
white paper in 1971. It interpreted the MCP’s return to
violent revolution as the party’s admittance of failure
and the defeat of so-called “open and legal struggle,”9
which had been in effect since the late 1950s.
According to the Malaysian government, communist
small-armed groups crossed the Thai-Malaysian border
and carried out terrorist activities directed toward local
people. The purpose was to dramatize their comeback
and their capabilities as well as constitute propaganda
to attract their supporters.10
Since mid-1968, therefore, Chinese propaganda
included West Malaysia as one of the areas where
“people’s armed struggles” were going on. Xinhua
reports on the development of those “people’s
revolutions” mentioned various successes gained by
the MNLA in repulsing the enemy’s attacks and in
“annihilating” their armed forces. The successes of the
MNLA, according to Xinhua, were due to the support
9

The Resurgence of Armed Communism in West Malaysia
(Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1 October 1971),
p.1.
10
Ibid., p.5
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movements in North Borneo and the opening of the
communist rebel’s representative office in Beijing,
the activities of the resurgent MCP were also
included in Chinese coverage.12

of the people (NCNA, 26 September 1968, & SCMP, 2
October 1968: 29).
The cultural Revolutionary period in China was
marked by call from Beijing to revolutionaries around
the world, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America
to raise arms to oppose and overthrow all
“reactionaries.” This call was especially strong after
the publication of Lin Biao’s famous article “Long
Live the Victory of People’s War” in September 1965.
Lin Biao’s thesis specifically called the use of
“surrounding the cities from the countryside” strategy
as applied by China during its revolutionary war in the
1930s and 1940s in world revolution. The late defense
minister and soon to be, for a time, their apparent to the
chairman theorized that revolutions in developing
countries (Asia, Africa, and Latin America) as the
world’s countryside were the first step toward further
revolutions in the developed areas of the world, which
according to Lin were world’s cities.11 Malaysian
communist rhetoric also followed Lin Biao’s analysis.
An article in the Malaya Bulletin which was later
published by the Chinese media described the
revolutionary situation in Malaya in mid-1968 as
victorious for the Malayan people in their struggle to
oppose Malaysia and Singapore which were “British
new type” colonies, aided by U.S. imperialism and
Soviet revisionist”(Peking Review, 8 March 1968: 35)
In discussing how Malayan revolutionaries should act,
the article, although it did not mention Lin Biao,
stressed the importance of his theory.
… in order to win victory it is imperative to persist in
the path of using the countryside to encircle the cities
and seizing political power by armed force, to oppose
the counter-revolutionary armed forces of the U.S.,
and British imperialist and their running dogs with
revolutionary armed forces and to oppose the unjust
colonial war of the imperialists and their running
dogs with the just war of national liberation (Peking
Review, 8 March 1968: 35).
Since 1968, therefore, in its propaganda against
Malaysia, in addition to reports on guerrilla
11

Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War,”
Peking Review, 36 (3 September 1965), pp. 9-39, especially
pp. 22-25 on the applicability of the “people’s war”
internationally. The publication of Lin Biao’s article
coincided with American military escalation in Vietnam. It is
therefore generally believed that Lin referred mostly to the
strategy and tactics of facing the U.S. in Vietnam. Although
Lin preached the importance of Mao’s theory of people’s war
as the most appropriate strategy and tactics to use in
revolutionary struggles in the less developed areas, he also
emphasized the importance of “self reliance” as the basic
principle for those revolutions. Cf. David Mozingo, An
Interpretation of Lin Biao’s September 3 Article (Santa
Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965); David Mozingo,
Thomas W. Robinson, Lin Biao on “People’s War”: China
Takes A Second Look Into Vietnam (Santa Monica: The Rand
Corporation, 1965).

By the end of 1969 the Chinese propaganda war
against Malaysia reached a new point. On November
23, 1969 the Malayan Communist underground
newspaper, Barisan, declared in its editorial the
inauguration of the Voice of Malayan Revolution
(Suara Revolusi Malaya – VOMR), a radio station
whose primary task was to propagate the “great Mao
Zedong Thought and the struggle of the MCP and the
[Malayan] people.” The establishment of the radio
station, according to the underground paper, was based
on the reason that in their oppression of the people,
“imperialism and reactionaries” in Malaya for a long
time had been using radio broadcast to spread counterrevolutionary propaganda. Thus, VOMR was a tool to
“disseminate revolution in order to defeat counterrevolution” (Guangming Ribao, 5 December 1969).
Reacting to the newly established VOMR, Tunku A.
Rahman accused that the radio station was located in
Yunnan province in South China (Asian Analyst,
January 1970:13).
The establishment of the VOMR was a part of China’s
propaganda program during the Cultural Revolution
period. In addition to VOMR, Beijing also formed the
Voice of the People of Thailand, another radio station
to give propaganda support to the “people’s war” in
that country.

4. Conclusion
The writer of this paper argues that contrary to the
traditionally accepted opinion The People’s Republic
of China participated in the Indonesian campaign to
crush Malaysia half-heartedly.13 In fact despite its
strong propaganda broadcast in supporting Indonesia,
the PRC was actually a passive participant in the
program. This is due to the fact that the Chinese
supported Malayan Communist Party at that time was
pursuing a more conciliatory policy toward the
Malaysian government. In addition China was
probably worried that bad relations with Malaysia
would affect the well-being of ethnic Chinese in
Malaysia. Seen from strategic basis, the attitude of the
Chinese was based on Mao’s teaching that in a
12

See for example: NCNA, 25 April 1968 (SCMP, 4166, 29
April 1968, p.28); NCNA 28 April 1968 (SCMP, 4167, 30
April 1968, pp.26-27); NCNA, 11 December 1968 (SCMP,
4320, 17 December 1968, p.23); NCNA, 28 December 1968
(FBIS, 1.7 20 January 1969, pp. A2-3); NCNA, 12 February
1968 (FBIS, 1.29, 12 February 1969, pp. A3-4); Peking
Review, 9 (28 February 1969, p.19).
13
This paper is a part of the writer’s dissertation presented to
the Graduated Division University of Hawaii, 1986. The
writer has added more current information to the paper.
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revolutionary war, the revolutionary army should not
face two enemies at the same time. At that time the
Chinese was supporting The Malayan Communist
Party, which was raising arms against the Malaysian
government and operating in the border area of
Malaysia and Thailand.
In the meantime, although the PRC was pursuing a
radical diplomacy, the MPC was basically taking peace
offensive tactic. Furthermore, the MCP after 1960 was
already in a defensive position and was not regarded by
both the Malayan government and the British
administration as a serious threat. Facts in this paper
show that the increasing hostility between Indonesia,
supported by China, and Malaysia, supported by the
West, did not automatically increase the activities of
the rebellious MCP.
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